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COLORADO
COURT OF APPEALS
Court
of Appeals No. 02CA0375
Industrial
Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
WC Nos.
4-347-510 & 4-428-324
Price
Mine Service, Inc.,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial
Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, TIG Insurance
Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company, Lester G.
Connell, and Rocky Mountain Miners,Respondents.
ORDER
SET ASIDE AND CASE
REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS
Division
I
Opinion
by JUDGE PIERCE*
Marquez
and Graham, JJ., concur
January
2, 2003
Weinberger
& Kanan, P.C., Michael P. Serruto, Robert A. Weinberger,
Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner
Ken Salazar,
Attorney General, John D. Baird, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals
Office
Ritsema
& Lyon, P.C., Michael A. Perales, Nancy C. Hummel, Denver,
Colorado, for Respondent TIG Insurance Company
No Appearance
for Respondent National Union Fire Insurance Company
*Sitting
by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo.
Const. art. VI, ''
5(3), and '' 24-51-1105,
C.R.S. 2002.
Withers
Seidman & Rice, P.C., Christopher Seidman, Grand Junction,
Colorado, for Respondent Lester G. Connell
No Appearance
for Respondent Rocky Mountain Miners
Michael
J. Steiner, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Compensation
Insurance Authority, d/b/a Pinnacol Assurance
Ken Salazar,
Attorney General, Frank R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of
Labor and Employment, Division of Workers' Compensation, and
Mary Ann Whiteside, in her official capacity as the Director
of the Division of Workers' Compensation
The principal
issue in this appeal is whether petitioner, Price Mine Service,
Inc., or TIG Insurance Company is liable to pay workers' compensation
benefits to Lester G. Connell (claimant) for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident during the 'quasi-course of employment.'
If the automobile accident is compensable as part of the original
injury, then TIG is liable as the insurer on risk at the time
of the original injury. If the accident constitutes a separate
compensable injury, then Price Mine is liable as an uninsured
employer at the time of the accident. We conclude that TIG
is liable and, therefore, set aside the order to the contrary.
Claimant
suffered a work-related injury in 1997 while working for Price
Mine, which was then insured for workers'
compensation liability by TIG. Claimant injured his right
eye, nose, teeth, neck, right arm, back, right knee, and heel.
TIG admitted liability and paid benefits relating to the original
claim.
Except
for eleven weeks of uncompensated attempts to work, claimant
did not return to work after the 1997 injury and remained
unemployed in 1998 and 1999. In 1999, he was injured in an
automobile accident while returning from authorized medical
treatment for the 1997 work-related injury. Claimant aggravated
the previous injuries to his back and neck and suffered additional
injuries to his left shoulder and elbow.
By the
time of the 1999 accident, Price Mine had ceased active business
operations and no longer had any employees or workers' compensation
coverage. All of the employees of Price Mine became employees
of another corporation owned by the same individual, and that
corporation obtained workers'
compensation from another carrier. Price Mine continued its
existence solely as a real estate holding company. TIG denied
liability for the second accident.
On review,
the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) held that an automobile
accident occurring during the quasi-course of employment period
constituted a "'distinct compensable event."
Therefore, it denied the claim against TIG and determined
that Price Mine was liable for the additional workers' compensation
benefits as an uninsured employer.
I.
Price
Mine asserts that TIG is liable for claimant's subsequent injury, which was compensable by
application of the quasi-course of employment doctrine. We
agree.
Under
the quasi-course of employment doctrine, an injury occurring
during travel to or from authorized medical treatment for
an industrial injury is compensable. An employer is required
to provide medical treatment, and an injured employee is required
to submit to it; thus, a trip to the doctor's office becomes
an implied part of the employment contract. Excel Corp.
v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 860 P.2d 1393 (Colo. App.
1993).
Under
the doctrine, the second injury is not considered an intervening
event that would otherwise relieve the employer from further
liability. Citadel Mall v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office,
892 P.2d 419 (Colo. App. 1994).
Here,
in concluding that the injuries sustained under the quasi-course
of employment doctrine were not compensable consequences of
the prior injury, but gave rise to a new claim for benefits,
the Panel relied principally on Employers Fire Insurance
Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 964 P.2d 591 (Colo.
App. 1998). It found additional support in City of Colorado
Springs v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 954 P.2d 637
(Colo. App. 1997), and Citadel Mall v. Industrial Claim
Appeals Office, supra.
However,
the Panel has reached the opposite decision in other cases,
holding that subsequent injuries compensable under the quasi-course
of employment doctrine do not give rise to a new claim.
We agree with this latter view and conclude that a quasi-course
of employment injury is a compensable consequence stemming
from the underlying industrial injury.
The quasi-course
of employment doctrine was created to provide the requisite
connection between the employment and an injury that would
not otherwise be considered to have arisen out of and in the
course of employment. See 'Larson's
Workers' Compensation Law'
10.05 et seq. (2002). It was designed to attenuate the usual
requisites of compensability, and thus, injuries received
while undergoing authorized medical treatment for an industrial
injury are considered compensable even though they occur outside
the ordinary time and space limits of normal employment.
Excel Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, supra.
Furthermore,
the proximate and natural consequences of an industrial injury
and quasi-course of employment injuries, as distinguished
from injuries caused by a separate, efficient intervening
event, are both considered to be within the range of compensable
consequences of the original industrial injury. See
1 Larson's', supra, 10.01 et seq. Both types
of events are compensable because of their relationship to
the underlying workers' compensation injury.
Thus,
we agree with the view that quasi-course of employment injuries
should not be treated any differently, for purposes of determining
benefits and liabilities, from complications that are the
natural and proximate results of the underlying industrial
injury. The cases relied upon by the Panel for the contrary
view can be distinguished factually or legally.
The determination
whether the injury sustained under the quasi-course of employment
doctrine was part of the first claim or a second claim was
not central to the decision in Employers Fire Insurance
Co., supra. There, the same insurer provided workers'
compensation benefits at the time of the original injury and
at the time of the later automobile accident injury during
the quasi-course of employment. The dispositive determination
on appeal was the effect of a release given after the original
injury but before the automobile accident under circumstances
where the claimant, unaware that the second claim was compensable
under the Act, had made a claim for benefits under his no-fault
policy.
Likewise,
the determination whether the subsequent injury was compensable
only as a separate claim also was not central to the analysis
in City of Colorado Springs, supra. There,
the question presented was whether the claimant was entitled
to further temporary disability benefits when there was no
credible evidence that he suffered increased physical restrictions
after the second injury. The issue of which insurer was liable
for the subsequent benefits was not presented. Indeed, the
division recognized that because the second injury resulted
from treatment for the first injury, the impairments resulting
from both injuries might be considered together in determining
the degree of permanent medical impairment.
Finally,
Citadel Mall, supra, is factually distinguishable
because in that case, unlike here, the claimant's injuries
were the result of a separate, new employment relationship
and an independent injury that occurred during that relationship,
which had no physical or medical connection to the first injury.
The necessity for on-the-job training, resulting from the
claimant's inability to perform his former job, was the only
link to the first employer; the second employer was receiving
the benefit of the claimant's secretarial services and partially
paying for them at the time of the second injury.
Therefore,
we conclude that an injury compensable based upon the quasi-course
of employment doctrine is not a new claim, but is properly
considered a compensable consequence of the original injury.
Applying that rule to this case, TIG, as the insurer on risk
at the time of the original 1997 injury, remains liable for
the benefits payable as a result of the automobile accident
in 1999, which was compensable based on the quasi-course of
employment doctrine.
According
to the Division of Workers' Compensation, this conclusion
is consistent with the public policy of assuring that all
employers have in effect current policies of insurance or
self-insurance for workers' compensation benefits, as stated
in 8-47-111(1), C.R.S. 2002. It also is consistent with the
legislative declaration to 'assure the quick and efficient
delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers.'
Section 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. 2002.
II.
Because
of this disposition, we need not address the alternative assertion
that Price Mine was not subject to the Workers' Compensation Act in 1999 because it had no
employees at that time.
The order
is set aside, and the case remanded to the Panel to reinstate
the original order obligating TIG to pay the temporary disability
and medical benefits payable to claimant as a result of the
1999 automobile accident.
JUDGE
MARQUEZ and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.
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